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PRELIMINARY MEMORANDUM 
October 9, 1981 Conference 
List 3, Sheet 1 
No. 81-244 
Loretto, et al 
v. 
~ o N.Y. Court of Appeals 
~ for the court: Garrielli 
concurring, Cooke dissenting) 
Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., et al State/Civil Timely 
1. SUMMARY: App argues that a state statute 
authorizing private cable television companies to install cables and 
other equipment on private property without compensation violates 
the fifth and fourteenth amendments. 
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2. FACTS AND DECISION BELOW: Section 828 of New 
York State's Executive Law provides in part that: 
"No landlord shall (a) interfere with the 
installation of cable television facilities upon his 
property or premises ... (b) [d]emand or accept payment 
from any tenant, in any form in exchange for permitting 
cable television service on or within his property or 
premises, or from any cable television company in exchange 
therefor in excess of any amount which the commission, 
shall, by regulation, determine to be reasonable." 
By regulation the State Commission on Cable Television has 
fixed at $1 the normal fee to which a landlord is entitled under 
§822(b) 's compensation provision. 
In February, 1972, app purchased a five-story 
apartment building. In February, 1976, she began a class action 
against appees, two cable television companies, on behalf of a class 
of all owners of real property in New York on which the companies 
had placed cable tv components. She asked for herself and for each 
member of the class damages for trespass and an injunction against 
its continuance. She sought damages in the amount of five percent 
of defendants' gross revenues from the invaded premises. 
Anticipating the companies' defense, she alleged as well that §822 
was invalid as purporting to authorize a taking without just 
compensation and a deprivation of property without due process of 
law. The City of New York was granted leave to intervene as a 
defendant. 
The opinion by the court of appeals fills 100 _____,, -
pages of the cert petition. After finding that app had standing to 
..,. -
sue and that she did not need to exhaust administrative remedies, 
the Court of Appeals held that §822 was a valid exercise of the 
~l 
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. 
• police power rather than a taking requiring compensation . First, 
• 
the court found that the section should be analyzed as an exercise 
of the police power and not as an exercise of the power of eminent 
domain. Had the section been an exercise of the power of eminent 
domain, it would have required the cable companies to compensate 
landlords rather than limiting their power to demand compensation. 
Even as an exercise of the police power, however, the section could 
survive only if reasonable and if not such an interferance with 
app's property as to constitute a "taking." 
The court concluded that the section was a 
reasonable exercise of the police power. The legislative purpose 
was to achieve the rapid development of a means of communication 
which has important educational and community aspects. And if the 
purpose is legitimate, so, too, the provisions of the section are 
reasonably and substantially related to that purpose. The history 
of cable tv prior to the enactment reveals that landlords were 
greatly inhibiting its development by exacting onerous fees and 
conditions. Moreover, the statute can also be seen as part of the 
"7 
regulation of the landlord-tenant relationship. Certainly, that is , 
a well recognized area of police power regulation. 
As to whether the regulation was yet such an 
interference as to amount to a taking depends on the character of 
the governmental action, its economic impact, and its interference 
with reasonable investment expectations. PruneYard Shopping Center 
v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 83 (1980). Here the government is acting 
not in its enterprise capacity--taking private resources for use in 




intervene to resolve a conflict over land use. The mere fact that ) 
there is a physical invasion of the property does not mean that the / 
regulation must be viewed as a taking. See PruneYard, supra. The 
destruction of one strand of the bundle of property rights does not 
require the conclusion that a taking has occurred. Andrus v. 
Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65-66. As to economic impact, when a 
regulation leaves but a bare residue of value to a property, a 
taking may be said to have occurred. But here app makes no claim 
that she is not receiving a fair return from her property. Rather 
she seeks to keep the companies from using a portion of her property 
for which she has no use herself. Finally, the court found that app 
had made no investment which the statute had frustrated as in Kaiser 
Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979). There is no indication 
that app made any investment in the expectation of cable tv fees. 
In concurring, Judge Garrielli argued that the 
statute did work a taking but that the legislative scheme provided 
for just compensation by the State Commission on Cable Television. 
In dissent, Chief Judge Cooke argued that the 
legislation was not a valid exercise of the police power but 
authorized an unconsitutional taking without just compensation. The 
statute does not involve a limitation on the uses to which a 
landlord can put a building, rather it involves a "State-authorized 
physical appropriation of a portion of the landlord's property." 
A78-79. Such appropriations of property have traditionally been 
considered per se cases of compensable takings without need to 
resort to balancing tests. Although courts and commentators have 
struggled with the question of when a regulation becomes a taking, 
- - 5. 
there has been no question that physical appropriation of property 
for public use is a taking requiring compensation. The instant case 
is not one where a landlord is prevented from evicting tenants or 
where a shopping center owner is forced to permit certain members of 
the public onto the premises as in PruneYard. Rather it is the 
traditional case involving the physical appropriation of the 
building for the use of another. 
By treating the traditional case of physical 
appropriation as just another police power regulation the court 
shifts the burden to the property owner to show that the regulation 
is unreasonable. Yet traditionally even an actual appropriation of 
only a minimal amount of property entitled the owner to 
compensation. "The majority in effect reasons that because 
• excessive and improper regulation under the police power is 
sometimes termed a de facto taking, police power analysis can 
therefore be applied to all takings, even those clearly falling into 
the traditional public appropriation category. This turns the de 
facto taking concept, originally an expansion of the traditional 
protection of the right to compensation, into a tool to sharply 
curtail that right." A90-91. There is no reason why cable tv 
companies should be treated any differently from telegraph, 
telephone, and other utility companies for whom eminent domain 
proceedings and appropriate compensation have been the method of 
development. 
3. CONTENTIONS: App repeats the arguments 
advanced by the dissent that the statute authorizes a taking without 




property for an easement is a per se taking requiring compensation 
is well established. In Kaiser Aetna, supra, the Court stated that 
"the 'right to exclude,' so universally held to be a fundamental 
element of the property right, falls within this category of 
interests that the Government cannot take without compensation." 
Accord Michelman, "Property, Utility and Fairness: Comments on the 
Ethical Foundations of 'Just Compensation" Law," 80 Harv. L. Rev. 
1165, 1184-86. 
App argues that PruneYard is distinguishable 
because there the property was not appropriated by the state to a 
particular use. Rather the Court simply held that once the owner 
had opened up his property to the general public, the state could 
regulate the owner's right to prohibit exercises of free speech 
commonly conducted in similar public plazas. The Court did not hold 
that the state might permit uninvited persons to make a permanent 
installation on property which is not open to the general public. 
Finally, app argues that even if the statute here is not found to be 
a per se taking, it amounts to a taking all the same as an 
unreasonable exercise of the police power. 
In response appee city argues that the regulation 
seeks to balance the competing interests of landlords and tenants so 
that tenants have the same access to cable service as do individual 
homeowners. This Court has recognized that there is no set formula 
for determining when there has been a taking. Penn Central 
Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). In 
PruneYard the Court held that "the fact that {the appellees] may 
. ' - - 7. 
have 'physically invaded' appellants' property cannot be viewed as 
determinative." 477 U.S. at 84. 
Appee cable tv companies argue that recent 
decisions by this Court in Penn Central, PruneYard, and Kaisner 
Aetna indicate that there are no per se rules in deciding whether a 
state regulation of property is a taking. 
The amicus brief by the State Attorney General 
repeats the arguments advanced by the Court of Appeals majority 
4. DISCUSSION: I recommend affirm. Although as 
a historical matter courts have probably treated physical 
appropriations as per se takings, there would not appear to be a 
federal constitutional requirement that they do so. In PruneYard the 
Court held that a state constitutional requirement that a property 
owner permit certain persons to enter on his property did not 
necessarily amount to a taking. Noting that "one of the essential 
sticks in the bundle of property rights is the right to exclude 
others" the Court nonetheless held that "the determination whether a 
state law unlawfully infringes a landowner's property in violation 
of the Taking Clause •.• entails inquiry into such factors as the 
character of the governmental action, its economic impact, and its 
interference with reasonable investment-backed expectations." 447 
U.S. at 82-83. 
Certainly the fact that a state law authorizes a 
physical invasion will be considered in the balance. But it would 
seem odd to adopt a rule that while the state may regulate to whom 
app may rent and at what pr ice, regulations that may cost app a 
great deal of money, the state may not authorize the placement of a 
'' 
.. 
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1/2 inch cable on the outside of the building without compensation. 
Moreover, there is considerable strength to the state's argument 
that what is being adjusted in this instance are the competing 
property rights of tenants and landlords. Finally, the Court of 
Appeals' argues persuasively that, if not a per se taking, nor does 
the statute here amount to a taking under the more general inquiry 
described above by the Court in PruneYard. 
There are two responses and one amicus brief. 
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JEAN LORETTO, ON BEHALF OF HERSELF AND ALL OTH- d.}-/' --b,,. ../~~ 
ERS SIMILARLY SITUATED, APPELLANT, v. TELE- ...Lr. :;;;x~:.~- \ 
PROMPTER MANHATTAN CATV CORP. ET AL. TP ~rt'---,. 
ON APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NEW YORK ~~, 
[May-, 1982) -  t.--i., 
JUSTICE MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the Court. ~ 
This case presents the question whether a minor but per- _,,,,; ,,.. __ ~ .. ~1 J 
manent physical occupation of an owner's property autho- ~,--.,,,,--,,..,,__, • 
rized by government constitutes a "taking" of property for / f-n,1-G~ 
which just compensation is due under the Fifth Amendment dt-~ 
of the Constitution. New York law provides that a landlord , · 
must permit a cable television company to install its cable fa-~ 
cilities upon his property. N. Y. Exec. Law§ 828 (1) (McK.in-
ney). In this case, the cable installation occupied portions o( / ., .,,,, ·__,,_ ~: ,· • 
appellant's roof and the side of her building. The New York( 7~ . 
Court of Appeals ruled that this appropriation does not ~ ~ U 
amount to a taking. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan /-' · · -
CATVCorp.,53N.Y.2d124,-N.E.2d-(1981). Be- /.z:;> 
cause we conclude that such a physical occupation of property~. ,, ~ . ~ 
is a taking, we reverse. -
I ~ 
Appellant Jean Loretto purchased a five-story apartment ) 
building located at 303 West 105th Street, New York, in ~ J,. J . ~A. 1 
1971. The previous owner had granted appellees Tele- ~
prompter Corporation and Teleprompter Manhattan CATV ~  
("Teleprompter") 1 permission to install a cable on the build- d.-
1 Teleprompter Manhattan CATV was formerly a subsidiary, and is now ~~ 





2 LORETTO v. TELEPROMPTER MANHATTAN CATV CORP. 
ing and the exclusive privilege of furnishing cable television 
("CATV") services to the tenants. The New York Court of 
Appeals described the installation as follows: 
"On June 1, 1970 TelePrompter installed a cable slightly 
less than one-half inch in diameter and of approximately 
30 feet in length along the length of the building about 18 
inches above the roof top, and directional taps, approxi-
mately 4 inches by 4 inches by 4 inches, on the front and 
rear of the roof. By June 8, 1970 the cable had been ex-
tended another 4 to 6 feet and cable had been run from 
the directional taps to the adjoining building at 305 West 
105th Street." Id., at 135. 
Teleprompter also installed two large silver boxes along the 
roof cables. The cables are attached by screws or nails pene-
trating the masonry at approximately two foot intervals, and 
other equipment is installed by bolts. 
Initially, Teleprompter's roof cables did not service appel-
lant's building. They were part of what could be described 
as a cable "highway" circumnavigating the city block, with 
service cables periodically dropped over the front or back of a 
building in which a tenant desired service. Crucial to such a 
network is the use of so-called "crossovers"-cable lines ex-
tending from one building to another in order to reach a new 
group of tenants. 2 Two years after appellant purchased the 
building, Teleprompter connected a "noncrossover" line-
2 The Court of Appeals defined a "crossover" more comprehensively as 
occurring: 
"when (1) the line servicing the tenants in a particular building is 
extended to adjacent or adjoining buildings, (2) an amplifier which 
is placed on a building is used to amplify signals to tenants in that 
building and in a neighboring building or buildings, and (3) a line is 
placed on a building, none of the tenants of which are provided 
CATV services, for the purpose of providing service to an adjoin-
ing or adjacent building." 53 N. Y. 2d, at 133, n. 6, -- N.E. 2d, 
at--, n. 6. 
- -
81-244-OPINION 
LORETTO v. TELEPROMPTER MANHATTAN CATV CORP. 3 
i. e., one that provided CATV service to appellant's own ten-
ants-by dropping a line to the first floor down the front of 
appellant's building. 
Prior to 1973, Teleprompter routinely obtained authoriza-
tion for its installations from property owners along the 
cable's route, compensating the owners at the standard rate 
of 5% of the gross revenues that Teleprompter realized from 
the particular property. To facilitate tenant access to 
CATV, the State of New York enacted §828 of the Executive 
Law, effective January 1, 1973. Section 828 provides that a 
landlord may not "interfere with the installation of cable tele-
vision facilities upon his property or premises," and may not 
demand payment from any tenant for permitting CATV, or 
demand payment from any CATV company "in excess of any 
amount which the [State Commission on Cable Television] 
shall, by regulation, determine to be reasonable." 3 The 
3 N. Y. Exec. Law § 828 (McKinney) provides in part: 
1. No landlord shall 
a. interfere with the installation of cable television facilities upon 
his property or premises, except that a landlord may require: 
i. that the installation of cable television facilities conform to such 
reasonable conditions as are necessary to protect the safety, func-
tioning and appearance of the premises, and the convenience and 
well-being of other tenants; 
ii. that the cable television company or the tenant or a combina-
tion thereof bear the entire cost of the installation, operation or 
removal of such facilities; and 
iii. that the cable television company agree to indemnify the land-
lord for any damage caused by the installation, operation or re-
moval of such facilities . 
b. demand or accept payment from any tenant, in any form, in ex-
change for permitting cable television service on or within his 
property or premises, or from any cable television company in ex-
change therefor in excess of any amount which the commission 
shall, by regulation, determine to be reasonable; or 
c. discriminate in rental charges, or otherwise, between tenants 
who receive cable television and those who do not. 
- -
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landlord may, however, require the CATV company or the 
tenant to bear the cost of installation and to indemnify for any 
damage caused by the installation. Pursuant to § 828(1)(b), 
the State Commission has ruled that a one-time $1 payment 
is the normal fee to which a landlord is entitled. In the Mat-
ter of Implementation of Section 828 of the Executive Law, 
New York State Commission on Cable Television, Statement 
of General Policy (Jan. 15, 1976) (Statement of General Pol-
icy), App. 51- 52; Clarification of General Policy (Aug. 27, 
1976), App. 68-69. The Commission ruled that this nominal 
fee, which the Commission concluded was equivalent to what 
the landlord would receive if the property were condemned 
pursuant to New York's Transportation Corporations Law, 
satisfied constitutional requirements "in the absence of a spe-
cial showing of greater damages attributable to the taking." 
Statement of General Policy, App. 52. 
Appellant did not discover the existence of the cable until 
after she had purchased the building. She brought a class 
action against Teleprompter in 1976 oh behalf of all owners of 
real property in the state on which Teleprompter has placed 
CATV components, alleging that Teleprompter's installation 
was a trespass and, insofar as it relied on § 828, a taking with-
out just compensation. She requested damages and injunc-
tive relief. 4 Appellee the City of New York, which has 
granted Teleprompter an exclusive franchise to provide 
CATV within certain areas of Manhattan, intervened. The 
Supreme Court, Special Term, granted summary judgment 
to Teleprompter and the City, upholding the constitutionality 
of § 828 in both crossover and noncrossover situations. 98 
Misc. 2d 944,415 N.Y.S. 2d, - N.E. 2d-(1979). The 
Appellate Division affirmed without opinion. 73 A.D. 2d 
849, - N.E. 2d - (1979). 
' Class action status was granted in accordance with appellant's request, 
except that owners of single family dwellings on which a CATV component 
had been placed were excluded. Notice to the class has been postponed, 
however, by stipulation. 
- -
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On appeal, the Court of Appeals, over dissent, upheld the 
statute. 53 N. Y. 2d 124, - N.E. 2d - (1981). The 
court concluded that the law requires the landlord to allow 
both crossover and noncrossover installations but permits 
him to request payment from the CATV company under 
§ 828(1)(b), at a level determined by the State Cable Commis-
sion, only for noncrossovers. The court then ruled that the 
law serves a legitimate police power purpose-eliminating 
landlord fees and conditions that inhibit the development of 
CATV, which has important educational and community 
benefits. Rejecting the argument that a physical occupation 
authorized by government is necessarily a taking, the court 
stated that the regulation does not have an excessive eco-
nomic impact upon appellant when measured against her ag-
gregate property rights, and that it does not interfere with 
any reasonable investment-backed expectations. Accord-
ingly, the court held that § 828 does not work a taking of ap-
pellant's property. Chief Judge Cooke dissented, reasoning 
that the physical appropriation of a portion of appellant's 
property is a taking without regard to the balancing analysis 
courts ordinarily employ in evaluating whether a regulation 
is a taking. 
In light of its holding, the Court of Appeals had no occasion 
to determine whether the $1 fee ordinarily awarded for a 
noncrossover installation was adequate compensation for the 
taking. Judge Gabrielli, concurring, agreed with the dissent 
that the law works a taking but concluded that the $1 pre-
sumptive award, together with the procedures permitting a 
landlord to demonstrate a greater entitlement, afford just 
compensation. We noted probable jurisdiction. -- U. S. 
- (1981). 
II 
The Court of Appeals determined that § 828 serves the le-
gitimate public purpose of "rapid development of and maxi-
mum penetration by a means of communication which has im-
portant educational and community aspects," 53 N.Y. 2d, at 
- -
81-244-OPINION 
6 LORETTO v. TELEPROMPTER MANHATTAN CATV CORP. 
143-144, -- N.E. 2d, at--, and thus is within the State's 
police power. We have no reason to question that deter-
mination. It is a separate question, however, whether an 
otherwise valid regulation so frustrates property rights that 
compensation must be paid. See Penn Central Transporta-
tion Co. v. New York City, 438 U. S. 104, 127-128 (1978); 
Delaware, L.& W.R. Co. v. Morristown, 276 U. S. 182, 193 
(1928). We conclude that a permanent physical occupation 
authorized by government is a taking without regard to the 
public interests that it may serve. Our constitutional his-
tory confirms the rule, recent cases do not question it, and 
the purposes of the Takings Clause compel its retention. 
A 
In Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 
438 U. S. 104 (1978), the Court surveyed some of the general 
principles governing the Takings Clause. The Court noted 
that no "set formula" existed to determine, in all cases, 
whether compensation is constitutionally due for a govern-
ment restriction of property. Ordinarily, the Court must en-
gage in "essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries." Id., at 124. 
But the inquiry is not standardless. The economic impact of 
the regulation, especially the degree of interference with in-
vestment-backed expectations, is of particular significance. 
"So, too, is the character of the governmental action. A 
'taking' may more readily be found when the interference 
with property can be characterized as a physical invasion by 
government, . . . than when interference arises from some 
public program adjusting the benefits and burdens of eco-
nomic life to promote the common good." Id. (citation 
omitted). 
As Penn Central affirms, the Court has often upheld sub-
stantial regulation of an owner's use of his own property 
where deemed necessary to promote the public interest. At 
the same time, we have long considered a physical intrusion 
by government to be a property restriction of an unusually 
- -
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serious character for purposes of the Takings Clause. Our 
cases further establish that when the physical intrusion 
reaches the extreme form of a permanent physical occupa-
tion, a taking has occurred. In such a case, "the character of 
the government action" is not only an important factor in re-
solving whether the action works a taking but is 
determinative. 
When faced with a constitutional challenge to a permanent 
physical occupation of real property, this Court has invari-
ably found a taking.• As early as 1871, in Pumpelly v. 
Green Bay Company, 13 Wall. 166 (1871), this Court held 
that the defendant's construction, pursuant to state author-
5 Professor Michelman has accurately summarized the case law concern-
ing the role of the concept of physical invasions in the development of 
takings jurisprudence: 
"At one time it was commonly held that, in the absence of explicit 
expropriation, a compensable 'taking' could occur only through 
physical encroachment and occupation. The modem significance 
of physical occupation is that courts, while they sometimes do hold 
nontrespassory injuries compensable, never deny compensation 
for a physical takeover. The one incontestable case for com-
pensation (short of formal expropriation) seems to occur when the 
government brings it about that its agents, or the public at large, 
'regularly' use, or 'permanently' occupy, space or a thing which 
theretofore was understood to be under private ownership." 
Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the 
Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 Harv. L. 
Rev. 1165, 1184 (1967) (emphasis original). 
See also 2 J. Sackman, Nichols' Law of Eminent Domain 6--50--6-51 (rev. 3d 
ed. 1980); L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 460 (1978). 
For historical discussions, see Loretto v. Teleprom pter Manhattan 
CATV Corp., 53 N.Y. 2d, at 157-158, - N.E. 2d, at - (Chief Judge 
Cooke, dissenting); F. Bosselman, D. Callies, & J. Banta, The Taking 
Issue 51 (1973); Stoebuck, A General Theory of Eminent Domain, 47 Wash. 
L. Rev. 553, 600-601 (1972); Dunham, Griggs v. Allegheny County in Per-
spective: Thirty Years of Supreme Court Expropriation Law, 1962 Sup. 
Ct. Rev. 63, 82; Cormack, Legal Concepts in Cases of Eminent Domain, 41 
Yale L. J. 221, 225 (1931). 
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ity, of a dam which permanently flooded plaintiff's property 
constituted a taking. A unanimous Court stated, without 
qualification, that "where real estate is actually invaded by 
superinduced additions of water, earth, sand, or other mate-
rial, or by having any artificial structure placed on it, so as to 
effectually destroy or impair its usefulness, it is a taking, 
within the meaning of the Constitution." Id., at 181. Seven 
years later, the Court reemphasized the importance of a 
physical occupation by distinguishing a regulation that 
merely restricted the use of private property. In Northern 
Transportation Co. v. Chicago, 99 U. S. 635 (1878), the 
Court held that the city's construction of a temporary dam in 
a river to permit construction of a tunnel was not a taking, 
even though the plaintiffs were thereby denied access to 
their premises, because the obstruction only impaired the use 
of plaintiffs' property. The Court distinguished earlier cases 
in which permanent flooding of private property was re-
garded as a taking, e. g., Pumpelly, supra, as involving "a 
physical invasion of the real estate of the private owner, and 
a practical ouster of his possession." In this case, by con-
trast, "[n]o entry was made upon the plaintiffs' lot." Id., at 
642. 
Since these early cases, this Court has consistently distin-
guished between flooding cases involving a permanent physi-
cal occupation, on the one hand, and cases involving a more 
temporary invasion, or government action outside the own-
er's property that causes consequential damages within, on 
the other. A taking has always been found only in the for-
mer situation. See United States v. Lynah, 188 U. S. 445, 
468-470 (1903); Bedford v. United States , 192 U. S. 217, 225 
(1904); United States v. Cress, 243 U. S. 316, 327-328 (1917); 
Sanguinetti v. United States, 264 U. S. 146, 149 (1924) (to be 
a taking, flooding must "constitute an actual, permanent in-
vasion of the land, amounting to an appropriation of, and not 
merely an injury to, the property"); United States v. Kansas 
City Life Insurance Co., 339 U. S. 799, 809-810 (1950). 
- -
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In St. Louis v. Western Union Telegraph Co ., 148 U. S. 92 
(1893), the Court applied the principles enunciated in 
Pumpelly to a situation closely analogous to the one pre-
sented today. In that case, the Court held that the city of 
St. Louis could exact reasonable compensation for a tele-
graph company's placement of telegraph poles on the city's 
public streets. The Court reasoned: 
"The use which the [company] makes of the streets is an 
exclusive and permanent one, and not one temporary, 
shifting and in common with the general public. The or-
dinary traveler, whether on foot or in a vehicle, passes to 
and fro along the streets, and his use and occupation 
thereof are temporary and shifting. The space he occu-
pies one moment he abandons the next to be occupied by 
any other traveler. . . . But the use made by the tele-
graph company is, in respect to so much of the space as 
it occupies with its poles, permanent and exclusive. It 
as effectually and permanently dispossesses the general 
public as if it had destroyed that amount of ground. 
Whatever benefit the public may receive in the way of 
transportation of messages, that space is, so far as re-
spects its actual use for purposes of highway and per-
sonal travel, wholly lost to the public. . . . It matters 
not for what that exclusive appropriation is taken, 
whether for steam railroads or street railroads, tele-
graphs or telephones, the state may if it chooses exact 
from the party or corporation given such exclusive use 
pecuniary compensation to the general public for being 
deprived of the common use of the portion thus appropri-
ated." Id., at 98-99, 101-102 (emphasis added). 6 
•The City of New York objects that this case only involved a city's right 
to charge for use of its streets, and not the power of eminent domain; the 
city could have excluded the company from any use of its streets. But the 
physical occupation principle upon which the right to compensation was 
based has often been cited as authority in eminent domain cases. See, 
- -
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Similarly, in Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Penn. R. 
Co., 195 U. S. 540 (1904), a telegraph company constructed 
and operated telegraph lines over a railroad's right of way. 
In holding that federal law did not grant the company the 
right of eminent domain or the right to operate the lines ab-
sent the railroad's consent, the Court assumed that the inva-
sion of the telephone lines would be a compensable taking. 
Id., at 570 (the right of way "cannot be appropriated in whole 
or in part except upon the payment of compensation"). 
Later cases, relying on the character of a physical occupa-
tion, clearly establish that permanent occupations of land by 
such installations as telegraph and telephone lines, rails, and 
underground pipes or wires are takings even if they occupy 
only relatively insubstantial amounts of space and do not seri-
ously interfere with the landowner's use of the rest of his 
land. See, e.g., Lovett v. West Va. Central Gas Co., --
W.Va. --, 65 S.E. 196 (1909); Southwestern Bell Telephone 
Co. v. Webb, 393 S.W. 2d 117, 121 (Mo. App. 1965). Cf. 
Portsmouth Harbor Land & Hotel Co. v. United States, 260 
U. S. 327 (1922). See generally 2 J. Sackman, Nichols' Law 
of Eminent Domain § 6.21 (rev. 3d ed. 1980). 7 
e.g., Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Penn. R. Co. , 195 U. S. 540, 
566-567 (1904); California v. United States, 395 F . 2d 261, 263, n. 4 (CA9 
1968). Also, the Court squarely held that insofar as the company relied on 
a federal statute authorizing its use of post roads, an appropriation of state 
property would require compensation. St. Louis v. Western Union Tele-
graph Co., 148 U. S. 92, 101 (1893). 
; Early commentators viewed a physical occupation of real property as 
the quintessential deprivation of property. See, e. g., 1 W. Blackstone, 
Commentaries *139; J. Lewis, A Treatise on the Law of Eminent Domain 
in the United States 197 (1888) ("Any invasion of property, except in case 
of necessity . . . , either upon, above or below the surface, and whether 
temporary or permanent, is a taking: as by constructing a ditch through it, 
passing under it by a tunnel , laying gas, water or sewer pipes in the soil, or 
extending structures over it, as a bridge or telephone wire." (footnote 
omitted; emphasis original)); P. Nichols, 1 The Law of Eminent Domain 
282 (2d ed. 1917). 
- -
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More recent cases confirm the distinction between a per-
manent physical occupation, a physical invasion short of an 
occupation, and a regulation that merely restricts the use of 
property. In United States v. Causby, 328 U. S. 256 (1946), 
the Court ruled that frequent flights immediately above a 
land owner's property constituted a taking, comparing such 
overflights to the quintessential form of a taking: 
"If, by reason of the frequency and altitude of the flights, 
respondents could not use this land for any purpose, 
their loss would be complete. It would be as complete 
as if the United States had entered upon the surface of 
the land and taken exclusive possession of it." Id., at 
261 (footnote omitted). 
As the Court further explained, 
"We would not doubt that, if the United States erected 
an elevated railway over respondents' land at the precise 
altitude where its planes now fly, there would be a par-
tial taking, even though none of the supports of the 
structure rested on the land. The reason is that there 
would be an intrusion so immediate and direct as to sub-
tract from the owner's full enjoyment of the property 
and to limit his exploitation of it." Id., at 264-265. 
The Court concluded that the damages to the respondents 
"were not merely consequential. They were the product of a 
direct invasion of respondents' domain." Id., at 265-266. 
See also Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U. S. 84 (1962). 
Two war-time takings cases are also instructive. In 
United States v. Pewee Coal Co., 341 U. S. 114 (1951), the 
Court unanimously held that the Government's seizure and 
direction of operation of a coal mine to prevent a national 
strike of coal miners constituted a taking, though members of 
the Court differed over which losses suffered during the pe-
riod of Government control were compensable. The plural-
ity had little difficulty concluding that because there had 
- -
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been an "actual taking of possession and control," the taking 
was as clear as if the Government held full title and owner-
ship. Id., at 116 (plurality opinion of Justice Black, with 
whom Justice Frankfurter, Justice Douglas, and Justice 
Jackson joined; no other Justice challenged this portion of the 
opinion). In United States v. Central Eureka Mining Co., 
357 U. S. 155 (1958), by contrast, the Court found no taking 
where the Government had issued a war-time order requiring 
nonessential gold mines to cease operations for the purpose of 
conserving equipment and manpower for use in mines more 
essential to the war effort. Over dissenting Justice Harlan's 
complaint that "as a practical matter the Order led to conse-
quences no different from those that would have followed the 
temporary acquisition of physical possession of these mines 
by the United States," id., at 181, the Court reasoned that 
"the Government did not occupy, use, or in any manner take 
physical possession of the gold mines or the equipment con-
nected with them.II Id., at 165-166. The Court concluded 
that the temporary though severe restriction on use of the 
mines was justified by the exigency of war. 8 Cf. YMCA v. 
United States, 395 U. S. 85 (1969) ("Ordinarily, of course, 
government occupation of private property deprives the pri-
vate owner of his use of the property, and it is this depriva-
tion for which the Constitution requires compensation." Id., 
at 92.) 
Although this Court's most recent cases have not ad-
dressed the precise issue before us, they have emphasized 
that physical invasion cases are special and have not repudi-
ated the rule that any permanent physical occupation is a 
taking. The cases state or imply that a physical invasion is 
subject to a balancing process, but they do not suggest that a 
permanent physical occupation would ever be exempt from 
the Takings Clause. 
8 Indeed, although dissenting Justice Harlan would treat the restriction 
as if it were a physical occupation, it is significant that he relies on physical 
appropriation as the paradigm of a taking. See id., at 181, 183-184. 
- -
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Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, as 
noted above, contains one of the most complete discussions of 
the Takings Clause. The Court explained that resolving 
whether public action works a taking is ordinarily an ad hoc 
inquiry in which several factors are particularly significant-
the economic impact of the regulation, the extent to which it 
interferes with investment-backed expectations, and the 
character of the governmental action. 438 U. S., at 124. 
The opinion does not repudiate the rule that a permanent 
physical occupation is a government action of such a unique 
character that it is a taking without regard to other factors 
that a court might ordinarily examine. 9 
In Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U. S. 164 (1979), the 
Court held that the government's imposition of a navigational 
servitude requiring public access to a pond was a taking 
where the land owner had reasonably relied on government 
consent in connecting the pond to navigable water. The 
Court emphasized that the servitude took the land owner's 
right to exclude, "one of the most essential sticks in the bun-
dle of rights that are commonly characterized as property." 
Id., at 176. The Court explained: 
"This is not a case in which the Government is exercising 
its regulatory power in a manner that will cause an in-
substantial devaluation of petitioner's private property; 
rather, the imposition of the navigational servitude in 
this context will result in an actual physical invasion of 
• The City of New York and the opinion of the Court of Appeals place 
great emphasis on Penn Central's reference to a physical invasion "by gov-
ernment," 438 U. S. , at 124, and argue that a similar invasion by a private 
party should be treated differently. We disagree. A permanent physical 
occupation authorized by state law is a taking without regard to whether 
the State, or instead a party authorized by the State, is the occupant. 
See, e.g. , Pumpelly, supra. Penn Central simply holds that in cases of 
physical invasion short of permanent appropriation, the fact that the gov-
ernment itself commits an invasion from which it directly benefits is one 
relevant factor in determining whether a taking has occurred. 438 U. S., 
at 124, 128. 
- -
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the privately owned marina. . . . And even if the Gov-
ernment physically invades only an easement in prop-
erty, it must nonetheless pay compensation. See 
United States v. Causby, 328 U. S. 256, 265 (1946); 
Portsmouth Co. v. United States, 260 U. S. 327 (1943)." 
Id., at 180 (emphasis added). 
Although the easement of passage, not being a permanent 
occupation of land, was not considered a taking per se, Kaiser 
Aetna reemphasizes that a physical invasion is a government 
intrusion of an unusually serious character. 10 
Another recent case underscores the constitutional distinc-
tion between a permanent occupation and a temporary physi-
cal invasion. In PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 
U. S. 74 (1980), the Court upheld a state constitutional re-
quirement that shopping center owners permit individuals to 
exercise free speech and petition rights on their property, to 
which they had already invited the general public. The 
Court emphasized that the state constitution does not pre-
vent the owner from restricting expressive activities by im-
posing reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions to 
minimize interference with the owner's commercial functions. 
Since the invasion was temporary and limited in nature, and 
since the owner had not exhibited an interest in excluding all 
persons from his property, "the fact that [the solicitors] may 
have 'physically invaded' [the owners'] property cannot be 
viewed as determinative." Id., at 84. 11 
10 See also A ndrus v. Allard, 444 U. S. 51 (1979). That case held that 
the prohibition of the sale of eagle feathers was not a taking as applied to 
traders of bird artifacts. "The regulations challenged here do not compel 
the surrender of the artifacts, and there is no physical invasion or restraint 
upon them. . . . In this case, it is crucial that appellees retain the rights 
to possess and transport their property, and to donate or devise the pro-
tected birds. . . . [L]oss of future profits-unaccompanied by any physi-
cal property restriction-provides a slender reed upon which to rest a 
takings claim." Id. , at 65--66. 
11 Teleprompter's reliance on labor cases requiring companies to permit 
- -
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In short, when the "character of the governmental action," 
Penn Central, 438 U. S., at 124, is a permanent physical 
occupation of property, our cases uniformly have found a tak-
ing to the extent of the occupation, without regard to 
whether the action achieves an important public benefit or 
has only minimal economic impact on the owner. 
B 
The historical rule that a permanent physical occupation of 
another's property is a taking has more than tradition to com-
mend it. Such an appropriation is perhaps the most serious 
form of invasion of an owner's property interests. To bor-
row a metaphor, cf. Andrus v. Allard, 444 U. S., at 65-66, 
the government does not simply take a single "strand" from 
the "bundle" of property rights: it chops through the bundle, 
taking a slice of every strand. 
Property rights in a physical thing have been described as 
the rights "to possess, use and dispose of it." United States 
v. General Motors Corp., 323 U. S. 373, 378 (1945). To the 
extent that the government permanently occupies physical 
property, it effectively destroys each of these rights. First, 
access to union organizers, see, e. g., Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U. S. 507 
(1976); Central Hardware Co. v. NLRB, 407 U. S. 539 (1972); NLRB v. 
Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U. S. 105 (1956), is similarly misplaced. As we 
recently explained: 
"[T]he allowed intrusion on property rights is limited to that nec-
essary to facilitate the exercise of employees' § 7 rights [to orga-
nize under the National Labor Relations Act]. After the requi-
site need for access to the employer's property has been shown, 
the access is limited to (i) union organizers; (ii) prescribed non-
working areas of the employer's premises; and (iii) the duration of 
the organization activity. In short, the principle of accommoda-
tion announced in Babcock is limited to labor organization cam-
paigns, and the 'yielding' of property rights it may require is both 
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the owner has no right to possess the occupied space himself, 
and also has no power to exclude the occupier from posses-
sion and use of the space. The power to exclude has tradi-
tionally been considered one of the most treasured strands in 
an owner's bundle of property rights. 12 See Kaiser Aetna, 
444 U. S., at 179-180; see also Restatement of Property § 7 
(1936). Second, the permanent physical occupation of prop-
erty forever denies the owner any power to control the use of 
the property; he not only cannot exclude others, but can 
make no non-possessory use of the property. Although 
deprivation of the right to use and obtain a profit from prop-
erty is not, in every case, independently sufficient to estab-
lish a taking, see Andrus v. Allard, 444 U. S., at 66, it is 
clearly relevant. Finally, even though the owner may retain 
the bare legal right to dispose of the occupied space by trans-
fer or sale, the permanent occupation of that space by a 
stranger will ordinarily empty the right of any value, since 
the purchaser will also be unable to make any use of the 
property. 
Moreover, an owner suffers a special kind of injury when a 
stranger directly invades and occupies the owner's property. 
As section IIA, supra, indicates, property law has long pro-
tected an owner's expectation that he will be relatively undis-
turbed at least in the possession of his property. To require, 
as well, that the owner permit another to exercise complete 
dominion literally adds insult to injury. See Michelman, 
Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical 
Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 
1165, 1228, and n. 110 (1967). Furthermore, such an occupa-
12 The permanence and absolute exclusivity of a physical occupation dis-
tinguish it from temporary limitations on the right to exclude. Not every 
physical invasion is a taking. As PruneYard Shopping Center, Kaiser 
Aetna and the intermittent flooding cases reveal, such temporary limita-
tions are subject to a more complex balancing process to determine 
whether they are a taking. The rationale is evident: they do not abso-
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tion is qualitatively more severe than a regulation of the use 
of property, even a regulation that imposes affirmative duties 
on the owner, since the owner may have no control over the 
timing, extent, or nature of the invasion. See infra, at--. 
The traditional rule also avoids otherwise difficult line-
drawing problems. Few would disagree that if the State re-
quired landlords to permit third parties to install swimming 
pools on the landlords' rooftops for the convenience of the 
tenants, the requirement would be a taking. If the cable in-
stallation here occupied as much space, again, few would dis-
agree that the occupation would be a taking. But constitu-
tional protection for the rights of private property cannot be 
made to depend on the size of the area permanently occu-
pied. 13 Indeed, it is possible that in the future, additional 
cable installations that more significantly restrict a landlord's 
use of the roof of his building will be made. Section 828 re-
quires a landlord to permit such multiple installations. 14 
13 In United States v. Causby, supra, the Court approvingly cited Butler 
v. Frontier Telephone Co., 186 N.Y. 486, 79 N.E. 716 (1906) , holding that 
ejectment would lie where a telephone wire was strung across the plain-
tiff's property without touching the soil. The Court quoted the following 
language: 
" ... an owner is entitled to the absolute and undisturbed posses-
sion of every part of his premises, including the space above, as 
much as a mine beneath. If the wire had been a huge cable, sev-
eral inches thick and but a foot above the ground, there would 
have been a difference in degree, but not in principle. Expand 
the wire into a beam supported by posts standing upon abutting 
lots without touching the surface of plaintiffs land, and the differ-
ence would still be one of degree only. Enlarge the beam into a 
bridge, and yet space only would be occupied. Erect a house 
upon the bridge, and the air above the surface of the land would 
alone be disturbed." United States v. Causby, 328 U. S. , at 265 
n. 10, quoting Butler v. Frontier Tel. Co. , 186 N. Y., at 491-492, 
79 N.E. , at-. 
14 Although the City of New York has granted an exclusive franchise to 
Teleprompter, it is not required to do so under state law, see N.Y. Exec. 
Law, § 811 et seq. (McKinney), and future changes in technology may cause 
- -
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Finally, whether a permanent physical occupation has oc-
curred presents relatively few problems of proof. The place-
ment of a fixed structure on land or real property is an obvi-
ous fact that will rarely be subject to dispute. Once the fact 
of occupation is shown, of course, a court should consider the 
extent of the occupation as one relevant factor in determining 
the compensation due. 15 For that reason, moreover, there is 
less need to consider the extent of the occupation in deter-
mining whether there is a taking in the first instance. 
C 
Teleprompter's cable installation on appellant's building 
constitutes a taking under the traditional test. The installa-
tion involved a direct physical attachment of plates, boxes, 
wires, bolts and screws to the building, completely occupying 
space immediately above and upon the roof and along the 
building's exterior wall. 
16 
( / 
In light of our analysis, we find no constitutional difference 
between a crossover and a noncrossover installation. The 
portions of the installation necessary for both crossovers and 
noncrossovers permanently appropriate appellant's property. 
Accordingly, each type of installation is a taking. 
Appellees raise a series of objections to application of the 
traditional rule here. . Teleprompter notes that the law ap-
the City to reconsider its decision. Indeed, at present some communities 
apparently grant nonexclusive franchises . Brief for National Satellite 
Cable Ass'n et al as Amici Curiae 21. 
15 In this case, the Court of Appeals noted testimony preceding the en-
actment of § 828 that the landlord's interest in excluding cable installation 
"consists entirely of insisting that some negligible unoccupied space remain 
unoccupied." Loretto, 53 N. Y. 2d, at 141 (emphasis omitted). The State 
Cable Commission referred to the same testimony in establishing a $1 pre-
sumptive award. Statement of General Policy (Jan. 15, 1976), App. 48. 
16 It is constitutionally irrelevant whether appellant (or her predecessor 
in title) had previously occupied this space, since a "landowner owns at 
least as much of the space above the ground as he can occupy or use in con-
nection with the land." United States v. Causby, 328 U. S., at 264. 
- -
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plies only to buildings used as rental property, and draws the 
conclusion that the law is simply a permissible regulation of 
the use of real property. We fail to see, however, why a 
physical occupation of one type of property but not another 
type is any less a physical occupation. Insofar as Tele-
prompter means to suggest that this is not a permanent phys-
ical invasion, we must differ. So long as the property re-
mains residential and a CATV company wishes to retain the 
installation, the landlord must permit it. 17 
Teleprompter also asserts the related argument that the 
State has effectively granted a tenant the property right to 
have a CATV installation placed on the roof of his building, as 
an appurtenance to the tenant's leasehold. The short an-
swer is that § 828(1)(a) does not purport to give the tenant 
any enforceable property rights with respect to CATV instal-
lation, and the lower courts did not rest their decisions on 
this ground. 18 Of course, Teleprompter, not appellant's ten-
ants, actually owns the installation. Moreover, the govern-
ment does not have unlimited power to redefine property 
rights. See Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 
449 U. S. 155, 164 (1980) ("a State, by ipse dixit, may not 
transform private property into public property without com-
pensation"); see generally PruneYard Shopping Center, 447 
u. s., at 91-95 (JUSTICE MARSHALL, concurring). 
Finally, we do not agree with appellees that application of 
the physical occupation rule will have dire consequences for 
the government's power to adjust landlord-tenant relation-
17 It is true that the landlord could avoid the requirements of § 828 by 
ceasing to rent the building to tenants. As appellant points out, however, 
such an argument would permit the government to place telephone poles in 
the back yards of homeowners who desired telephone service without pay-
ing compensation. The right of a property owner to exclude a stranger's 
physical occupation of his land cannot be so easily manipulated. 
18 We also decline to hazard an opinion as to the respective rights of the 
landlord and tenant under state law prior to enactment of § 828 to use the 
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ships. This Court has consistently affirmed that States have 
broad power to regulate housing conditions in general and 
the landlord-tenant relationship in particular without paying 
compensation for all economic injuries that such regulation 
entails. See, e. g., Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United 
States, 379 U. S. 241 (1964) (discrimination in places of public 
accommodation); Queenside Hills Co. v. Saxl, 328 U. S. 80 
(1946) (fire regulation); Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U. S. 503 
(1944) (rent control); Home Building & Loan Ass'n v. 
Blaisdell, 290 U. S. 398 (1934) (mortgage moratorium); Ed-
gar A. Levy Leasing Co. v. Siegel, 258 U. S. 242 (1922) 
(emergency housing law); Block v. Hirsh, 256 U. S. 135 
(1921) (rent control). In none of these cases, however, did 
the government authorize the permanent occupation of the 
landlord's property by a third party. Consequently, our 
holding today in no way alters the analysis governing the 
State's power to require landlords to comply with building 
codes and provide utility connections, mailboxes, smoke de-
tectors, fire extinguishers, and the like in the common area of 
a building. So long as these regulations do not require the 
landlord to suffer the physical occupation of a portion of his 
building by a third party, they will be analyzed under the 
multi-factor inquiry generally applicable to non-possessory 
governmental activity. See Penn Central, supra. 19 
19 If § 828 required landlords to provide cable installation if a tenant so 
desires, the statute might present a different question from the question 
before us , since the landlord would own the installation. Ownership would 
give the landlord rights to the placement, manner, use , and possibly the 
disposition of the installation. The landlord would decide how to comply 
with applicable government regulations concerning CATV and therefore 
could minimize the physical, aesthetic, and other effects of the installation. 
Moreover, if the landlord wished to repair, demolish, or construct in the 
area of the building where the installation is located, he need not incur the 
burden of obtaining the CATV company's cooperation in moving the cable. 
In this case, by contrast, appellant suffered injury that might have been 
obviated if she had owned the cable and could exercise control over its in-
- -
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III 
Our holding today is very narrow. We affirm the tradi-
tional rule that a permanent physical occupation of property 
is a taking. In such a case, the property owner entertains an 
historically-rooted expectation of compensation, and the 
character of the invasion is qualitatively more intrusive than 
perhaps any other category of property regulation. We do 
not, however, question the equally substantial authority up-
holding a State's broad power to impose appropriate restric-
tions upon an owner's use of his property. 
Furthermore, our conclusion that § 828 works a taking of a 
portion of appellant's property does not presuppose that the 
substantial fee which many landlords had obtained from Tele-
prompter prior to the law's enactment is a proper measure of 
the value of the property taken. 20 A court may appropriately 
consider additional factors beyond the price that landlords ac-
tually obtained in the past in determining the fair market 
value of the property. See generally United States v. 564.54 
Acres of Land, 441 U. S. 506 (1979). The New York State 
Cable Commission, after considering evidence with respect 
to the ordinary value of the space occupied by CATV installa-
stallation. The drilling and stapling that accompanied installation appar-
ently caused physical damage to appellant's building. App. 83, 91>--96, 104. 
Appellant, who resides in her building, further testified that the cable in-
stallation is "ugly." App. 99. Although § 828 provides that a landlord 
may require "reasonable" conditions that are "necessary" to protect the ap-
pearance of the premises and may seek indemnity for damage, these provi-
sions are somewhat limited. Even if the provisions are effective, the in-
convenience to the landlord of initiating the repairs remains a cognizable 
burden. 
20 For example, if the 5% fee would have been exacted without regard to 
the amount of space occupied, then that fee might not be considered the 
fair market value of the occupied space at all, but instead the value to the 
CATV company of access to tenants. 
We also note that appellant apparently did not obtain such a fee from 
Teleprompter. Her predecessor in title granted Teleprompter permission 
to install a cable for a flat fee of $50 for a five year term. 
- -
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tions, has established a presumptive $1 award for noncross-
over takings, and permits the landlord to establish that ac-
tual damages are greater. Whether this procedure of 
valuation is adequate, and whether the absence of an award 
specifically designated for crossover takings is permissible in 
light of the level of compensation awarded for noncrossovers, 
are questions for the lower courts to address on remand. 21 
The judgment of the New York Court of Appeals is re-
versed and the case is remanded for further proceedings not 
inconsistent with this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
21 In light of our disposition of appellant's takings claim, we do not ad-
dress her contention that § 828 deprives her of property without due proc-
ess of law. 
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